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This thesis analyzes the Modernized Retirement System introduced in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016. Specifically, this thesis 
determines if the Modernized Retirement System is likely to affect manpower levels. 
A survey was conducted within the active component of the U.S. Marine Corps to 
compare expected lengths of service between the current retirement system and the 
Modernized Retirement System. The analysis utilizes Kaplan-Meier survival analysis for 
expected lengths of service and probit regression models to evaluate various retirement 
choices under the Modernized Retirement System. 
The results of the analysis indicate the U.S. Marine Corps will experience a 
change in expected lengths of service for officers and enlisted Marines under the 
Modernized Retirement System. On average, enlisted Marines exhibit an approximate 2 
percentage-point difference in length of service while officers exhibit an approximate 15 
percentage-point difference across the two retirement systems. As the U.S. Marine Corps 
implements the Modernized Retirement System in 2018, retention and recruiting policies 
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With an increasingly fiscally austere environment, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) needs to make prudent cost-saving decisions. Manpower, the largest appropriation 
of the DOD budget, totals approximately $178.9 billion for fiscal year 2016 (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015a). Of the $178.9 billion manpower 
appropriation, retired pay accrual accounts for approximately 10% (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015b). Efforts to reduce spending on military 
personnel are not new to the 2016 budget. The National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 established the Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission (hereafter referred to as “the Commission”). The 
Commission spent 2013 and 2014 researching a variety of cost-savings initiatives for 
Congress, one particularly being retirement reform. In January of 2015, the Commission 
submitted their recommendation to Congress on reforming the retirement system, which 
was subsequently approved on the NDAA for fiscal year 2016 for implementation in 
2018. However, those within the DOD and other military advocates fear the new 
retirement system will affect future manning and recruiting efforts. 
The primary objective of this research is to determine if the Modernized 
Retirement System has a likelihood of affecting retention levels. Surveying the active 
component of the U.S. Marine Corps provided information related to expected length of 
service under the current and new retirement systems. In addition to expected length of 
service, the survey provided insight on the impacts of the shift in retirement system, 
specifically opt-in rates for eligible Marines, contribution rates to the Thrift Savings Plan, 
and lump sum participation rates under the new retirement system. The research used 
data from the survey and demographic data from the Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW). In examining economic theory, workers make job choices based on a number 
of factors, one being compensation. This research contributes to literature on worker 
choice and the importance of competitive compensation packages. Based on the 
economic theory of worker choice, I believe the U.S. Marine Corps will not experience 
any significant shift in retention rates. 
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As preparations began for the 2016 budget, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter 
spoke to Congress discussing compensation. In his remarks, Secretary Carter (2015a) 
discussed the need to not only provide service members with adequate pay and other 
compensation, but also to shift some funding from compensation to training, readiness, 
and capabilities. Investing in those areas is the responsible decision to prevent needlessly 
putting service members in unnecessary risk situations on the battlefield. Secretary 
Carter’s thoughts are echoed in a recent study by Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai 
(2015). They found younger veterans are exhibiting lower retirement wealth compared to 
older cohorts. Modernizing the retirement system may assist in retirement wealth for 
future veterans.   
Currently, the retirement system uses a practice known as “cliff vesting,” in which 
service members are required to serve a minimum of 20 years before they are eligible for 
voluntary retirement. No government-sponsored benefits exist for service members who 
leave the military prior to serving the required 20 years for retirement eligibility. 
According to the Commission (2015), the current generation of service members prefers 
more “flexible retirement options, rather than the defined benefit” system in place. Due to 
the shift in retirement benefit desires coupled with the need to remain competitive with 
the civilian market, Congress modernized the retirement system. Under the Modernized 
Retirement System, the retirement plan is comprised of two components—a defined 
benefit portion and a defined contribution portion. Further, Congress incorporated other 
aspects for force retention and retirement payout flexibility for service members. 
While researching new retirement systems, the Commission looked to the private 
sector for ideas and best practices. The private sector first pioneered the shift to hybrid 
retirement plans in the early 1990s. Those shifts are documented in scholarly literature 
studying the private sector and military contexts. Choi (2015) analyzed the defined 
contribution pension plans, specifically discussing the effects of employee participation, 
contribution rates, and automatic enrollment in the defined contribution plan. Choi (2015) 
used economic theory to explain that employer match rates should not affect the 
employee’s decision “to participate in a defined contribution plan.” In justifying his 
statement, Choi evaluates previous studies and identifies significant errors indicating that 
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it is difficult to empirically measure the relationship between employer match rates and 
employee participate rates. In discussing employee contribution rates, Choi used the 
income and substitution effects to illustrate the difficulty in predicting matches with 
average employee contribution rates. Last, Choi discussed companies automatically 
enrolling employees at a default contribution rate to the defined contribution plan. Based 
on his research, Choi states that “automatically enrolled employees usually do not stop 
contributing to the plan once enrolled,” resulting in increased financial stability for 
employees (Choi, 2015, p. 12).   
In examining defined contribution plans, the question of a default rate and 
investment fund becomes more important to understand. Choi, Laibson, Madrain, and 
Metrick (2001) analyzed three different companies and their default 401(k) contribution 
rates. In their research, they found that companies who use default enrollment in a 
company’s defined contribution pension plan drastically increase participation rates. The 
researchers found that 65–87% of plan participants remained at the default contribution 
rate and the default fund initially; however, participation rates at the default rate and fund 
decreased over time. The researchers conclude automatic enrollment in defined 
contribution plans increases participation rates and increases wealth accumulation; 
however, the low default rate and low-risk default fund do not significantly increase 
retirement savings. 
In order to make an informed choice when considering contribution rates, 
investment funds, and other financial decisions, financial literacy is crucial to sound 
financial decisions. Hastings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn (2013) discussed the importance 
of financial literacy, and its relationship with solid financial decisions. They cited a 
myriad of examples found in literature indicating low financial literacy may correlate 
with individuals foregoing participation in 401(k) or other retirement savings plans, lack 
of portfolio diversification, and purchase of whole life insurance policies rather than 
cheaper term plans (Hastings, Madrian, & Skimmyhorn, 2013). In their review, they 
identified conflicting arguments for the “effects of financial literacy and financial 
outcomes” (Hastings, Madrian, & Skimmyhorn, 2013). Because of the number of 
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contributing factors to increasing financial literacy varying across individuals, research in 
this area is inconclusive according to the authors.   
The Australian Defence Force shifted their retirement compensation package in 
the early 1990s. Cunha, Menichini, and Crockett (2015) analyzed the Australian Defence 
Force’s retirement plan shift. Similar to the United States’ Department of Defense 
retirement plan, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had a 20-years-of-service defined 
benefit retirement plan until 1991. Individuals serving in the ADF for 20 years or more 
were eligible for “a pension equal to a percentage of their final pay” (Cunha, Menichini, 
& Crockett, 2015). In 1991, the ADF shifted to a retirement plan which had both a 
defined benefit and defined contribution aspect similar to what Congress recently 
approved for the DOD. Using survival analysis, Cunha, Menichini, and Crockett show 
that the high years of service vesting requirement had significant retention impacts on the 
ADF.  
Even though updating the retirement system was necessary, doing so judiciously 
remains a priority. Managing force levels with constantly changing civilian market 
opportunities demands that the compensation package for military service members 
remain competitive in order to retain service members for a career. Asch, Hosek, and 
Mattock (2014) studied recommended retirement plans similar to the recently approved 
plan; however, they applied historical data to the retirement plans to estimate retention. 
Surveying the U.S. Marine Corps and explicitly asking the expected length of service will 
provide more useful results. 
The results of this thesis reveal an interesting finding on expected length of 
service. According to my research, the Modernized Retirement System induces young 
enlisted Marine to remain in the U.S. Marine Corps longer. Conversely, officers exit the 
U.S. Marine Corps at a higher rate under the Modernized Retirement System compared to 
the current retirement system. My findings may have implications for recruitment and 
retention policies. Marines are more likely to contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan at 5% 
or higher. I believe Marines want to maximize their retirement wealth by ensuring they 
receive the maximum government matching. Another important financial finding is the 
decision to opt into the new retirement system. Younger Marines, both officer and 
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enlisted, have a higher probability to opt into the Modernized Retirement System 
compared to older Marines. 
This thesis focuses on the DOD shift in retirement plans and the manpower 
implications of the new retirement system. Chapter II discusses the genesis of the military 
retirement system, and its evolution over time. In Chapter II, I introduce the Modernized 
Retirement System and a detailed description of changes to the DOD retirement plan is 
provided. Chapter III describes the methodology in the research to include the data 
sources and analysis methods. Chapter IV provides the research data and results of the 
analysis. Conclusions based on the research findings and further research 
recommendations are found in Chapter V. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
To thoroughly understand the significance of the recent change to the military 
retirement system, it is important to understand the origins of the current system. 
Throughout its history, there have been three major milestones in the retirement system. 
In 1948, the retirement system was first standardized across all military services (DOD 
Office of the Actuary, 2015). The 1948 system remained unchanged until 1980 when a 
new retirement annuity formula was introduced, known as High Three (DOD Office of 
the Actuary, 2015). The last major revision to the military retirement system was in 1986 
when another annuity formula known as REDUX was introduced to provide service 
members some financial flexibility (Kamarck, 2015). The retirement system remained 
unchanged from 1986 until 2015 with the approval of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2016. The NDAA radically changed the military’s approach to 
retirement with the introduction of the modernized retirement system. 
The following historical summation of the military retirement system relies 
heavily on information from the Office of the Actuary and a Congressional Research 
Service report. Since World War II, the U.S. military retirement system remained 
relatively stable with cliff vesting at 20 years of service. The Army and Air Force 
Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 standardized the non-disability 
retirement plan for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The act established 20 years of 
service as a minimum for voluntary retirement (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2015, p. 54). 
Military service members who entered the military before September 8, 1980 receive a 
defined benefit equal to their final monthly basic pay multiplied by 2.5% for each year of 
service (Kamarck, 2015). This retirement compensation package is known as the Final 
Basic Pay System. In December of 1980, the retired pay formula was changed to what is 
now known as the High Three formula. Under the High Three option, service members 
who entered the military after September 8, 1980 receive a defined benefit equal to the 
average of the final three years of basic pay multiplied by 2.5% for every year of service 
(Kamarck, 2015). 
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The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 changed the military’s retirement 
system again, adding a third retirement compensation system known as the REDUX 
system. Under the REDUX system, military service members receive 2% of their basic 
pay for each year under 20 years of service, 3.5% for the next 10 years, and then 2.5% for 
any remaining time of creditable service after 30 years. At the age of 62, the service 
member’s pension was recomputed to match the High Three annuity. However, Kamarck 
(2015) noted the REDUX formula was changed in 1999. Under the updated REDUX 
option, “service members who entered the military on or after August 1, 1986 receive a 
$30,000 career status bonus at 15 years of service” (contingent on 5 more years of 
military service), and the retirement multiplier is reduced to 2.0% from 2.5%. The 
defined benefit calculation remains the same as the “High Three” option using the new 
multiplier (Kamarck, 2015). Service members currently serving in the military who do 
not qualify for the Final Basic Pay System are required to choose their retirement 
package at 15 years of qualified service; they must select either the High Three or 
REDUX package. 
Since 1999, the military retirement system has remained unchanged. However, 
with the large portion of the budget devoted to manpower coupled with criticisms of the 
military retirement system, Congress sought to reduce retirement expenditures by 
modernizing the retirement system. According to Asch, Hosek, and Mattock (2014), the 
military retirement system was antiquated and did not match the evolving civilian 
retirement systems. They noted a number of deficiencies with the military’s retirement 
system, stating that a “minority of military members qualifies for retirement benefits—
roughly 34% of officers and 14% of the enlisted force” (p. v). In the private sector, 
vesting occurs much sooner and incorporates a defined contribution plan to the defined 
benefit plan known as a hybrid retirement system. Although individuals vest much earlier 
in the private sector compared to the DOD, retirement benefits do not begin until the 
individual reaches full retirement age as defined by the Social Security Administration. 
Conversely, service members receive a retirement annuity immediately upon retiring. The 
defined contribution plan provides employees the ability to take some retirement benefits 
whether they leave a company at 10 years or retire from the company. Asch, Hosek, and 
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Mattock (2014) stated that service members, generally, prefer current over deferred 
compensation. Due to the increasing personnel costs and outdated retirement system, 
Congress looked to modernize the military’s retirement system. 
With the approval of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016, the military retirement 
system changed significantly to better match the private sector and provide some level of 
benefits to all service members. The new retirement plan, known as the Modernized 
Retirement System (MRS) takes effect in the 2018 calendar year. The MRS has four 
components. Under the MRS, service members are eligible to receive a defined benefit 
after serving 20 years of credible service. The defined benefit is calculated in the same 
way as the REDUX program, meaning the final three years of basic pay is averaged and 
multiplied by 2.0% for every year of credible service. The NDAA established a defined 
contribution under the MRS. Service members will automatically be enrolled in the 
defined contribution plan at 3% of their basic pay (Carter, 2015b). The government will 
deposit an amount equal to 1% of the service member’s basic pay until the service 
member has served two years of service. When a service member reaches two years of 
service, the government will match the individual contribution up to 4%. Service 
members can adjust their contribution amount after they complete their first financial 
education course at their first duty station. Service members can choose how to invest 
their contributions in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account.  
At the discretion of the service secretaries, a continuity bonus may be paid to 
service members during 8 to 12 years of service. The DOD will provide a continuation 
bonus contingent on serving four more years of service. The bonus amounts to 2.5 times 
a service member’s monthly basic pay. Last, the MRS contains a lump sum option. 
Service members have the option of receiving a portion of their pension as a lump sum. 
In particular, a service member can choose to receive at retirement a lump sum payment 
of either 25% or 50% of the pension payments they would have received through 67 
years of age. If a lump sum option is chosen, monthly pension amounts will be reduced 
by 25% or 50% until age 67. At 67 years of age, all service members will receive 100% 
of their entitled monthly pay regardless of whether they opted to receive the lump sum 
payment.   
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With the creation of the Modernized Retirement System, the military retirement 
system is set to significantly change in 2018, arguably the most significant change in the 
history of the system. DOD leadership and external agencies fear the change will affect 
manpower levels across the entire DOD. Separately, whether or not this new system will 
generate savings for the DOD remains a concern for budgeting purposes. The addition of 
a defined contribution plan as well as the option to shift to the new system for currently 
serving service members leaves a large knowledge gap for future budgeting. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
With a conceptual framework of the retirement system in place, this chapter 
describes my methodology in research. I first discuss the economy theory of worker 
choice and utility functions. Using economic theory, I discuss how choice and utility 
functions influenced my survey. While creating the survey, I made some assumptions 
which ultimately shaped the construction of the survey and survey population. After 
discussing the assumptions in the construction of the survey and the survey population, I 
provide a general overview of the survey format. The complete survey can be found in 
the appendix. In addition to the survey, I used multiple data sources for a more robust 
analysis of the economic choices of the survey participants. Last, I provide a description 
of my methods of analysis. 
Economic theory suggests workers make decisions on jobs based on utility 
functions for each individual. Workers weigh hours of work and leisure as well as 
compensation when making job preference decisions. Compensation is not limited to 
merely the hourly wage or salary but rather all benefits, tangible and intangible. The 
retirement system of a firm plays a critical role in workers’ job preference decisions. 
Workers not only consider compensation within the firm but also compare outside 
options with other firms. 
When discussing compensation and retirement specifically, service members 
regularly make the decision to either remain in the military or leave in pursuit of other 
private sector opportunities. Costo (2006) discusses the decline in defined benefit 
retirement systems, listing a myriad of reasons. The most significant reason for the 
decline is the increasing deferred costs on a firm. With the introduction of 401(k) and 
403(b) defined contribution plans, firms shifted their retirement systems from the defined 
benefit plans to more defined contribution plans due in large part of the tax benefits to 
both the worker and firm. Costo (2006) notes the decline of defined benefit plans and rise 
of defined contribution plans. This shift allows vesting much earlier for the worker. The 
defined contribution plan allows workers to become more mobile in job movement which 
is attractive to the millennial generation (Asch, Hosek, & Mattock, 2014, p. vi). 
 12 
The new Modernized Retirement System remains highly competitive, offering 
defined benefits immediately upon retirement unlike private sector retirement systems 
requiring workers to reach retirement age before pension annuities begin. That aspect 
alone supports my hypothesis that the U.S. Marine Corps will not see a significant effect 
on manpower with the implementation of the Modernized Retirement System. The added 
defined contribution plan provides some retirement wealth for all service members 
regardless of length of service. 
In order to conduct my research, I created a survey to elicit retirement choices of 
Marines. While creating the survey, I made assumptions and created informational tools 
for survey participants. With an eye for cost estimates for the U.S. Marine Corps, I 
designed two metrics to categorize survey participants’ risk tolerance and default 
behaviors. In the survey, I had a series of questions to help categorize those behaviors. 
First, I created some risk tolerance questions adapted from a survey created by Grable 
and Lytton (1999). Although their original survey contained 20 questions, I used the first 
five questions in my survey. I felt the five questions I chose provided an accurate 
representation of risk tolerance. I scored the five risk questions of the survey using the 
same grading criteria created by Grable and Lytton. In order to then categorize Marines 
on a scale from low to high risk individuals, I used the same score distribution as the 20 
question survey and applied it to my five questions. Table 1 provides the aggregate risk 
score and categorization of risk tolerance. 
Table 1.   Categorization of Risk Tolerance 
Aggregate Risk Score Description 
0–5 Low Risk 
6–9 Below Average 
10–12 Average 
13–16 Above Average 





I used a similar approach in calculating the default index for the survey 
participants. I wrote two questions with the purpose of identifying participants’ 
propensity to adjust default configurations such as default settings on a new computer. 
With the Modernized Retirement System establishing a default individual contribution 
rate for each service member, I felt an index measuring propensity for accepting defaults 
may provide useful information for financial forecasting under the Modernized 
Retirement System. 
In constructing the survey, I felt survey participants needed monetary amounts to 
assist them in making decisions. Because the defined benefit remained a constant feature 
in both the current and Modernized Retirement System, I estimated pre-tax retirement 
annuity amounts for both officers and enlisted personnel. Table 2 is an example of an 
annuity table I provided survey participants. 
Table 2.   Example of Retirement Annuity Table 




E-6 $1,900 $1,500 
E-7 $2,200 $1,800 
E-8 $2,400 $1,900 
E-9 $2,800 $2,200 
O-4 $3,700 $3,000 
O-5 $4,200 $3,300 
 
Because the Modernized Retirement System introduces a defined contribution 
aspect, I provided survey participants with estimated Thrift Savings Plan balances across 
various participation rates and rates of return. I first chose the default participation rate 
established by the DOD as 3% of a Marine’s basic pay. I then chose different 
participation rates based on Choi, Laibson, Madrain, and Metrick’s research. To create 
the various tables, I used the 2015 military pay chart for pre-tax monthly basic pay 
amounts. Using the standard promotion rates published by Headquarters, United States 
Marine Corps, I calculated the monthly contributions based on the participation rates, 
adjusted for inflation (R. Garza, personal communication, October 18, 2015; 
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Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2006). I compounded the balances using the 
mean rate of return published by the Thrift Savings Plan website (“Annual returns,” n.d.). 
Of the various Thrift Savings Plan options, I chose the F, C, and S Funds to represent the 
low, medium and high risk investments, respectively. The table headers provide survey 
participants with the standard deviation of each investment (“TSP Funds,” n.d.). The 
tables capture both the individual contribution and the government contribution to 
include matching starting at 2 years of creditable service. Table 3 is an example of a TSP 
table I provided survey participants. 
Table 3.   Example of TSP Table 
On average, this investment has a 5% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 chance 
that the return in any year will be anywhere between 1% and 9%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $4,500 $11,500 $18,500 $23,000 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $10,100 $28,100 $46,100 $56,100 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $16,100 $46,100 $76,200 $92,300 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $22,500 $65,500 $108,500 $131,000 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 20 YOS: $29,200 $85,500 $141,800 $171,000 
 
The NDAA provided all services the ability to offer continuity bonuses at the 
discretion of each service secretary. Because the bonus is a possibility and an important 
length of service consideration, providing monetary figures on possible bonus amounts 
remained consistent with my logic in constructing the survey to best support educated 
decisions. Table 4 is the continuity bonus table found in the survey. 
Table 4.   Continuity Bonus Table 








The Modernized Retirement System also introduced a lump sum option for 
retiring service members. As I did previously, I provided survey participants with 
estimated lump sum payout options. The lump sum option provides Marines with a 
discounted lump sum payment at the moment of retirement with a reduced annuity until 
full retirement age. For the purposes of my survey, I defined full retirement age as 67 
years old (Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, 2015). For enlisted 
Marines, retirement age from the U.S. Marine Corps was standardized as 38 years old; 
retirement age was standardized as 44 years old for officers. Using ranks E6 through E9 
and O4 through O5, I estimated the total retirement amount for a retiring Marine. I then 
applied both lump sum options separately and discounted the total using a 7% discount 
rate (Office of Management and Budget, 1992). The discounted value was the estimated 
lump sum payout. Next to the lump sum payout, I provide the survey participants with 
the reduced annuity amount. Table 5 is the lump sum table I used in the survey. 
Table 5.   Lump Sum Table 








E-6 $72,300 $1,100 $144,500 $800 
E-7 $86,700 $1,400 $173,400 $900 
E-8 $91,500 $1,400 $183,100 $1,000 
E-9 $106,000 $1,700 $212,000 $1,100 
O-4 $128,500 $2,300 $257,100 $1,500 
O-5 $141,400 $2,500 $282,800 $1,700 
 
While constructing the survey, I realized I had to exclude some individuals from 
the survey population. I removed prior-enlisted officers and warrant officers from the 
sample population due to the variability of their time in service. As previously 
mentioned, the survey provided Marines estimates of retirement annuities, TSP amounts, 
and lump sum payments based on rank and time in service. When creating those amounts, 
I used standard promotion rates published by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (R. 
Garza, personal communication, October 18, 2015; Headquarters, United States Marine 
Corps, 2006). Because prior enlisted officers and warrant officers have varying 
commissioning dates and time in service, they do not follow the standard promotion rates 
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relevant to the survey. Therefore, I removed those individuals from the sample 
population. I used the TFDW data to remove all prior-enlisted officers and warrant 
officers from my survey population. 
According to the NDAA, service members with 12 years of creditable service or 
less as of December 31, 2017 are eligible to opt into the Modernized Retirement System. 
Using December 31, 2017, I calculated the years of creditable service of each survey 
participant with their active duty base date. Using the TFDW data, I removed all Marines 
with more than 15 years of creditable service from the survey population. The survey was 
released to Marines serving in the active component, ranks E1 through O4, with 15 years 
of creditable service or less assigned to I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as of 
February 6, 2016. Because the survey population joined the military after September 8, 
1980, all survey participants are ineligible for the Final Basic Pay System. Due to their 
ineligibility, all survey participants face the choice between the High Three and REDUX 
compensation package under the current system.   
For my research, I utilized Lime Survey, a web-based survey application hosted 
by the Naval Postgraduate School. In the survey, I provided Marines with an explanation 
of the current retirement system and Modernized Retirement System. After the 
description of each retirement system, I asked survey participants a variety of questions 
targeting their retirement choices under each system. Specifically, I asked Marines for 
their expected length of service, Thrift Savings Plan participation, and whether or not 
they intend to opt into the Modernized Retirement System. 
The survey consists of 25 questions divided into four sections: background, 
current retirement plan, new retirement plan, and miscellaneous. Section I contains nine 
questions. I asked Marines to provide their Department of Defense Identification (DOD 
ID) number and identify if they are enlisted or an officer. The DOD ID number was used 
to match participant responses with demographic data received from TFDW. The data 
received from TFDW is discussed later in this Chapter. I tailored the survey to provide 
only relevant dollar amounts based on whether the participant was an enlisted Marine or 
an officer. I then asked two general questions to identify whether or not participants 
adjusted default settings. As previously mentioned, these two questions may help identify 
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propensity to change the default contribution rate for the defined contribution portion of 
the new retirement system. The remaining five questions were adapted from a survey 
created by Grable and Lytton (1999) used to identify risk behavior in investments. 
Section II contains two questions. After explaining the current retirement system 
in the U.S. Marine Corps, I asked survey participants to identify which compensation 
package they would choose if given the option, High Three or REDUX. Additionally, I 
asked survey participants to provide their expected length of service under the current 
retirement plan, ranging from 1 year to 20+ years. For the purpose of my research, any 
service past 20 years was lumped together due to the cliff vesting nature of the DOD 
retirement system. 
Section III contains seven questions. I start Section III with a brief description of 
the new retirement plan. After the brief description, I asked survey participants if they 
want more information. Selecting “yes” provided the survey participant with a more 
detailed explanation of the Modernized Retirement System to include dollar figures with 
the remaining six questions listed below the explanation. Selecting “no” populated the 
remaining six questions on the screen. Similar to Section II, I asked participants to 
provide their expected length of service under the new retirement plan ranging from 1 
year to 20+ years. In this section, I asked if the participants understand the differences in 
the two retirement plans and if they felt the information provided in the survey allowed 
them to make an informed decision. The remaining three questions asked participants to 
choose specific aspects of the new retirement plan. 
The final section, Section IV, contains seven questions. In this section, I asked 
survey participants about their current Thrift Savings Plan behaviors. I asked for 
additional demographic information from survey participants that I was unable to obtain 
from TFDW. Specifically, I asked if a married Marine’s spouse is employed and 
household annual earnings. I asked survey participants to imagine they were not in the 
U.S. Marine Corps and provide the civilian job sector they most likely would be 
employed, and an estimation of annual salary for themselves and their spouse if not in the 
military. These three questions may provide an insight on Marines’ opportunity cost to 
serve in the U.S. Marine Corps. 
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After the survey was written, I needed to decide how to conduct the survey within 
the U.S. Marine Corps. Using my experience and knowledge of the organizational 
structure of the U.S. Marine Corps, I chose to use I MEF as my survey population. A 
MEF is a three-star major command within the U.S. Marine Corps. The MEF is 
comprised of all four components of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and is the most 
representative unit of the entire U.S. Marine Corps. Encompassing all four components of 
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force ensured my survey population would be 
representative of the entire U.S. Marine Corps. Table 6 provides the population of the 
U.S. Marine Corps and the survey population across all ranks using the survey population 
constraints. 
Table 6.   Population Distribution 
Rank Percent in 
Marine Corps 
Percent in I 
MEF 
E-1 3.51 0.28 
E-2 12.15 6.62 
E-3 27.21 32.54 
E-4 24.84 32.61 
E-5 16.96 16.44 
E-6 7.61 5.23 
E-7 0.73 0.4 
E-8 0.01 0 
E-9 0 0 
O-1 0.99 0.48 
O-2 1.87 2.23 
O-3 3.43 2.77 
O-4 0.7 0.39 
 
I requested data from TFDW to assist my analysis. The TFDW data included pay 
grade, armed forces active duty base date, date of birth, home of record information, race, 
education, gender, marital status, primary military occupational specialty, Armed Forces 
Qualification Test, and General Classification Test of all Marines serving in I MEF. At 
the completion of the survey, I matched survey responses with the demographic data 
provided by TFDW using the DOD ID number. No unmatched data was used in the 
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analysis; however, I used the demographics of the non-participants as a comparison with 
those who chose to participate in the survey. 
The TFDW data contained 295 different primary military occupational specialty 
codes. I created five different categories to capture the large number of primary military 
occupational specialties. I defined combat arms as the primary military occupational 
specialties that were previously closed to women. Aviation was comprised of pilots and 
Naval Flight Officers across all airframes as well as all primary military occupational 
specialties directly related to aviation according to their occupational field. All remaining 
primary military occupational specialties were categorized as combat service support. 
Table 7 provides a detailed list of how I categorized each occupational specialty. 
Table 7.   Categorization of Primary Military Occupational Specialties 




Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle 
Combat Service 
Support 
Acquisition Management Professional (MOS=8059) 
Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense 
Combat Camera (COMCAM) 
Communications 
Distribution Management 
Engineer, Construction, Facilities, and Equipment 
Financial Management 
First Sergeant/Sergeant Major (MOS=8999) 
Food Service 
Ground Electronics Maintenance 
Ground Ordnance Maintenance 




Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Plans 
Marine Corps Community Services 
Military Police, Investigations, and Corrections 
Motor Transport 
Music 
Personnel and Administration 
Public Affairs 
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Category Occupational Field 
Recruiting And Retention 
Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare 




Air Control/Air Support/Anti-Air Warfare/Air Traffic Control 
Aircraft Maintenance 
Aircraft Maintenance (Fixed-Wing) 
Aircraft Maintenance (Rotary-Wing) 
Airfield Services 
Aviation Command and Control (C2) Electronics Maintenance 
Aviation Intelligence Officers (MOS=0207) 
Aviation Logistics 
Aviation Ordnance 
Intermediate Avionics Maintenance 
Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) 
Navigation Officer/Enlisted Flight Crews 
Organizational Avionics Maintenance 
Pilots/Naval Flight Officers 
 
Similarly, I created six rank variables to categorize the various ranks in my 
TFDW data. Using the Enlisted Promotions Manual (2006), I defined junior Marines as a 
Marine serving in the ranks of E1 through E3. A noncommissioned officer was defined as 
Marines in the ranks of E4 and E5. All remaining enlisted Marines, E6 through E9, were 
defined as staff noncommissioned officers. Rather than group all junior officers into one 
category, I chose to break them into two categories. For officers, first and second 
lieutenants were grouped together while captains were their own category. In recent 
years, Marines have served in the rank of captain for an average of 6 years. Because 
officers hold the rank of captain for such a long time, the nature of their decision making 
may change significantly during that time span as individuals mature. Grouping them 
together with first and second lieutenants who hold each of those ranks on average for 
two years reduces the effects on the research data of decisions made in the survey by 
captains. All remaining officers were grouped as field grade officers mirroring the DOD 
definition (Department of Defense, n.d.). Table 8 provides the specific rank breakdown. 
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Table 8.   Table of Rank Breakdown 
Category Ranks 
Junior Marine E-1 through E-3 
Noncommissioned Officer E-4 and E-5 
Staff Noncommissioned Officer E-6 through E-9 
Lieutenants O-1 and O-2 
Captain O-3 
Field Grade O-4 
 
Last, I created education variables. Using the U.S. Marine Corps Total Force 
Systems Codes Manual, I created two education variables based on the data from TFDW. 
Due to the volume of codes used to capture education levels in the U.S. Marine Corps, I 
narrowed the education categories for my analysis. During my review of the data, I found 
433 Marines without education codes in their records. For the purposes of my analysis, I 
assumed enlisted Marines with a missing education code possessed a high school 
diploma. Similarly, I assumed any officer without an education code attained a college 
degree. My assumption is consistent with the stated requirements published by the U.S. 
Marine Corps (“Requirements,” n.d.). However, the education codes in TFDW are 
subject to error. The information resident in TFDW is only as good as the administrative 
support entering information in a Marine’s record as well as the individual Marine 
verifying the accuracy of his record. My interpretation of the U.S. Marine Corps Total 
Force Systems Codes Manual and categorization of a Marine’s education could result in a 
measurement error. However, I do not think this error significantly impacts my categories 
as the vast majority of the definitions were straightforward, and I grouped education into 
two broad categories. Table 9 provides the education categories and educational 
certifications in TFDW. 
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Table 9.   Education Categories 
Education Categories Educational Certifications 
High School Diploma Less than a high school diploma  
High school diploma 
GED or equivalent 
Adult education diploma 
High school certificate of attendance 
Home study diploma 
Non-traditional high school 
Occupational program certificate 
Correspondence school diploma 
Completed one semester of college 
Associate’s Degree 




To more thoroughly analyze my results on retirement choices, I added additional 
data to my master data file. I matched individual military occupational specialties with 
their civilian counterpart, standard occupational classification (SOC) codes, using data 
from the National Crosswalk Service Center. Once matched, I used data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics to match the SOC with 2014 average annual earnings. Using the 2014 
pay table, I added annually salaries based on individual rank and time in service. I used 
the 2014 pay chart so the annual salaries from the pay chart and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics were in 2014 real dollar amounts. 
The useable data set includes 28,122 Marines. Variables used in the research are 
provided in Table 10. 
 23 
Table 10.   Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
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With those variables and the survey responses, I conducted a survival analysis to 
determine the length of service probabilities for each retirement system. In the 
Modernized Retirement System, Marines are faced with multiple retirement decisions. I 
used probit regression analysis to estimate the probabilities of Marines opting into the 




With all the data joined together in one master data file, I began my analysis. I 
first made sure my data was representative of the population of I Marine Expeditionary 
Force. I conducted the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of the entire sample then broke 
down the sample into two groups, officers and enlisted Marines. While conducting the 
survival analysis, I reviewed the covariates of expected length of service given the two 
retirement systems for both officers and enlisted Marines. Last, I explored the covariates 
of the various retirement choices under the Modernized Retirement System.  
In order to send the survey recruitment email, I utilized the Manpower 
Information Systems Division at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to email the survey on 
my behalf. Providing email addresses to the U.S. Marine Corps is strictly voluntary 
which impacted the number of Marines receiving the recruitment email. On February 18, 
2016, the survey was sent to 28,054 Marines who were assigned to I MEF as of February 
6, 2016. The sample size of the survey was 41,615 Marines. Of the sample size, 1,152 
Marines participated in the survey, broken down in Tables 11 and 12. Of note, the 
enlisted respondents drastically under-represented the population. Conversely, the officer 
respondents better represented the population. 
Table 11.   Enlisted Survey Participation 
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Table 12.   Officer Survey Participation 
 
 
I first conducted the survival analysis to examine any changes in expected years 
of service given the different retirement plans. Using the Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates, I found a difference in the expected length of service for both the officers and 
enlisted. I confirmed the difference by examining the kernel density graph and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test. According to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, Panel B has a p-value of 0.059 and Panel C has a p-value of 0.000. Figures 1 
through 3 provide the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates in three separate panels: the entire 
sample, enlisted, and officers.   
Although statistically significant, the differences in expected lengths of service 
are small in magnitude. For the enlisted Marines, the Modernized Retirement System is 
inducing young Marines to remain in the U.S. Marine Corps for a longer period of time. 
At 5 and 8 years of service, enlisted Marines exit the U.S. Marine Corps at a lower rate 
under the Modernized Retirement System compared to the current retirement system. 
From 0 to 20 years of service, enlisted Marines, on average, stay in for a longer period of 
time under the Modernized Retirement System. For officers, the current retirement 
system is preferred over the Modernized Retirement System. At 4, 8, and 10 years of 
service, officers exit the U.S. Marine Corps at a higher rate under the Modernized 
Retirement System compared to the current retirement system.   
Interestingly, both officer and enlisted exhibit similar behavior at 12 and 16 years 
of service. As previously mentioned, the U.S. Marine Corps may offer a continuity bonus 
at 12 years of service contingent on 4 more years of service. Both Panel B and Panel C 
experience a drop in manpower at the 12 and 16 years of service. The continuity bonus 
policy may contribute to Marines desiring to exit the U.S. Marine Corps rather than 
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commit to an additional 4 years of service. Marines who were offered and elected to 
receive the continuity bonus can exit the U.S. Marine Corps at 16 years of service. Both 
Panel B and C reflect a drop in retention at 16 years of service. From 16 years of service 
to 20 years of service, the manpower levels remain relevantly constant over than 4 year 
period of time. Enlisted Marines exhibit approximately 2 percentage point difference in 
manpower levels between the Modernized Retirement System and current retirement 
system. Officers exhibit a larger difference with approximately 15 percentage point 
difference in manpower levels across the two retirement systems.   
Figure 1.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates: All Marines 
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Figure 2.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates: Enlisted 
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Figure 3.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates: Officers 
 
 
With the retirement plan of the DOD shifting to this modernized approach with 
both defined contribution and benefit options, I wanted to identify the opt-in rates. This 
information is of critical importance to the U.S. Marine Corps, and the larger DOD, as it 
may significantly impact future budgets. Table 13 displays the probit regression output. 
Figures 4 through 6 display opt-in rates by years of service in three panels: the whole 
survey population, enlisted, and officers. 
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Table 13.   Opt-in Results 
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Figure 4.  Opt-in Rates by Years of Service: All Marines 
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Figure 5.  Opt-in Rates by Years of Service: Enlisted 
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Figure 6.  Opt-in Rates by Years of Service: Officers 
 
 
With the implementation date set for January of 2018, I expected to find younger 
Marines would choose to opt into the Modernized Retirement System compared to older 
Marines. According to Table 13, compared to younger survey participants, older 
participants are less likely to opt into the Modernized Retirement System for both officers 
and enlisted Marines. As expected, Marines more junior in rank are more likely to opt 
into the Modernized Retirement System compared to staff noncommissioned officers.   
Similar to the opt-in percentages, estimates in lump sum payouts and TSP 
contribution rates may also have significant impacts on the DOD budget in future years. 
Table 14 displays the probit regression output of the TSP contribution rate.  
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Unfortunately, as shown in Table 14, the results are largely inconclusive. Very few 
variables are statistically significant; however, some inferences can be extrapolated from 
the results. Table 14 shows there is a lot of evidence Marines will shift from the default 
participant rate of 3%. That is an important finding for future budgeting concerns from 
the U.S. Marine Corps and larger DOD. 
Figure 7 displays the percentages of individual TSP contribution rates using the 
rates found in the survey. 





Last, I estimated the covariates on the lump sum option opportunity provided by 
the Modernized Retirement System. I first estimated whether or not any lump sum option 
was taken. Then, given a lump sum was taken, I estimated the probability the Marine 
would take the 50% lump sum option. Table 15 displays the probit regression output of 
the lump sum option. 




Similarly to the TSP participation rates, the results for the lump sum option were 
inconclusive. Although not statistically significant, I found that married Marines are more 
likely to take a lump sum option compared to single Marines. An interesting note is the 
standardized risk variable. Although not statistically significant, the larger the propensity 
for risk, the more likely an individual will take any lump sum option. Like the TSP 
contribution rate, important economic inferences can be made from the results. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The current military retirement system is an outdated method of compensating 
service members. Although very generous for the individuals receiving the benefits, the 
vast majority of military service members do not serve long enough to be eligible for 
retirement benefits. Further, the millennial generation prefers to frequently change jobs 
before settling on their career (Asch, Hosek, & Mattock, 2014, p. vi). Implementing the 
Modernized Retirement System provides some form of retirement benefit for all service 
members while retaining a generous defined benefit for those serving a minimum for 20 
years in the military. Additionally, the Modernized Retirement System provides a force 
retention measure in the form of the continuity bonus. 
My research shows U.S. Marine Corps officer manpower levels will not be 
significantly affected with the establishment of the Modernized Retirement System. 
However, enlisted Marines exhibited a statistically significant difference in manpower 
levels across the current system and the Modernized Retirement System. This finding 
may have impacts on recruiting and retention policies and procedures within the U.S. 
Marine Corps. Separately, the Modernized Retirement System may incentivize a larger 
portion of the millennial generation to join the military service. Under the Modernized 
Retirement System, all service members depart the military with some form of retirement 
savings. 
My research provides a general understanding for expected behavior in 
participation in the Thrift Savings Plan, lump sum behaviors, and opt-in rates for officers 
and enlisted Marines. These three options provided by the Modernized Retirement 
System play a critical role in future budgeting. I found the majority of survey participants 
will contribute 5% to their Thrift Savings Plan to receive the maximum government 
matching opportunity. I found that officers and enlisted Marines currently serving in their 
initial contract are more likely to opt into the Modernized Retirement System compared 
to more senior Marines. As the U.S. Marine Corps continues to plan for the 
implementation date of January 1, 2018, the results from my survey provide useful 
budgeting tools for the future year defense plans. 
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My research was not all-encompassing and did not exhaust all opportunities for 
research in this area. If cost savings truly remains a concern for the Department of 
Defense, further research could be conducted on more aggressive policy changes to the 
military retirement system. If the DOD changed the retirement system and paid 
retirement annuities only when retirees reached retirement age, I suspect the government 
would save a considerable amount of money. If that is not a viable option, Congress 
should perhaps consider structuring the DOD’s retirement system like the private sector 
in further reducing the defined benefit aspect of retirement and increase the defined 
contribution aspect.  
An ex-post analysis should be done in future years to analyze the true effects of 
the shift in military retirement. The ex-post analysis should include the opt-in rates 
exhibited across all services as that provides relevant information applicable to private 
sectors. The analysis should also include the Thrift Savings Plan behaviors for financial 
planning. With data based on actual results rather than hypothetical results, the DOD can 
better forecast the trends of TSP costs. 
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APPENDIX.  RETIREMENT SURVEY 
Introduction. A new military retirement plan was approved by President Obama on 25 
November 2015 to begin as early as 2018. This online survey will assist the Marine 
Corps in determining the retention impacts of the new retirement plan. The information 
provided in this survey is not endorsed by the Marine Corps. The modernized retirement 
system presented in the survey is the current understanding of the future retirement 
system but may not be what is ultimately implemented in 2018. You can participate in the 
survey during on and off duty hours and will be available for 1 month. Your survey 
responses will be combined with portions of your personnel record for this research using 
your EDIPI. Once your responses are matched with your demographic information 
provided by the Total Force Data Warehouse, the EDIPI will be deleted from the 
research. 
 
Time requirement. Approximately 20 minutes.   
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risk of participating in this study is an 
unauthorized disclosure of survey responses. The risk of a loss of confidentiality is 
minimal; outside information not collected in this survey is required to match you with 
your EDIPI. 
 
Anticipated Benefits. This survey will provide critical information to the Marine Corps on 
military compensation. You may directly benefit from your participation in this research by 
learning about the proposed changes to the military retirement system enabling you to 
make a more informed decision regarding your retirement.   
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If 
you choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the 
study. You will neither be penalized in any way nor lose any benefits to which you would 
otherwise be entitled if you choose not to participate in or withdraw from this study. The 
alternative to participating in the research is to not participate in the research. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will 
be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All reasonable efforts will be 
made to safeguard your personal information; however, total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed. Any identifiable information will be destroyed at the completion of the 
research. All data collected from this survey will be stored on the secure servers of the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you 
experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while 
taking part in this study please contact Greg Moynihan at gtmoynih@nps.edu or Dr. Jesse 
Cunha at jcunha@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research 
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subject, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School Internal Review Board Chairman, 
Dr. Lawrence G. Shattuck at lgshattu@nps.edu or 831–656-2473. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read and understand the information provided above. I 
have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I may print a copy of this form for my records and I agree to 
participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research, I do 
not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
  I consent to participate in the research. 
  I do not consent to participate in the research. 
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SECTION I. BACKGROUND 
 
1. Are you an officer or enlisted Marine? 
 a. Officer 
 b. Enlisted 
 
2. Please provide your EDIPI. 
 **Text box fill-in 
 
3. When signing up for a website, do you: 
 a. Keep the box checked to be enrolled in newsletters and emails from the website 
 b. Uncheck the box to avoid receiving newsletters and emails from the website 
 
4. You just bought a new laptop computer, do you: 
 a. Keep the factory settings 
 b. Adjust the factory settings 
 
5. How would your friends describe you? 
 a. Jumps headfirst into things 
 b. Does a little research before taking any risks 
 c. Careful 
 d. Avoids risks entirely 
 
6. Would you rather: 
 a. Take $1,000 in cash now 
 b. Have a 50% chance of getting $5,000 
 c. Have a 25% chance of getting $10,000 
 d. Have a 5% chance of getting $100,000 
 
7. Imagine you are three weeks away from taking a “once in a lifetime” vacation and you 
lose your job. What would you do? 
 a. Cancel the vacation. 
 b. Take a more modest vacation 
 c. Go as scheduled 
 d. Extend your vacation because you don’t know if you will ever be able to travel 
first class again. 
 
8. If you had $20,000 to invest, would you: 
 a. Deposit the money in a bank or purchase a certificate of deposit 
 b. Invest in safe high quality bonds or bond mutual funds 
 c. Invest in the stocks or stock market funds 
 
9. How would you describe your comfort-level of risky investing? 
 a. Not at all comfortable 
 b. Somewhat comfortable 
 c. Very comfortable 
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SECTION II. CURRENT RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
Please read the following information and answer the questions below. 
 
The current military retirement system allows service members to receive a pension after 
a minimum of 20 years of military service. The Department of Defense provides the 
following two options: 
 
High-3:  A Marine receives 50% of his/her average pay for the last 3 years of service, 
taxed as ordinary income.   
 
REDUX:  A Marine receives 40% of his/her average pay for the last 3 years of service, 
taxed as ordinary income. In addition, the REDUX plan also provides a lump sum of 
$30,000 (approximately $21,000 after taxes) at the 15th year of service.  
 
Monthly Pension Payments 
Calculated from the 2015 military pay chart 
 




E-6 $1,900 $1,500 
E-7 $2,200 $1,800 
E-8 $2,400 $1,900 
E-9 $2,800 $2,200 
O-4 $3,700 $3,000 
O-5 $4,200 $3,300 
 
If you do not reach 20 years of service, you do not receive a pension. 
 
10. If you serve to 15 years of service, you will be required to make a choice between 
High-3 and REDUX. Which plan do you think you would choose? 
 a. High-3 
 b. REDUX 
 
11. How many years of service do you expect to have when you separate from the Marine 
Corps?  
 **Answer range from 1 – 20+ years 
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SECTION III. NEW RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
Please read the following information and answer the questions below. 
 
The new retirement plan has four key changes. A brief summary of the changes is 
provided below with more detailed information beneath the questions. 
 
Change 1:  Upon retirement with at least 20 years of service, monthly pension payments 
would equal the amounts listed under the REDUX plan (refer to table above). As 
currently, the payments would be taxed as ordinary income. 
 
Change 2:  The Marine Corps has introduced a defined contribution portion of the 
retirement compensation package. Upon entering the Marine Corps, the government 
would automatically establish a transfer of 3% of a Marine’s pay into the Thrift Savings 
Plan (TSP). The government would also deposit an amount equal to 1% of a Marine’s 
pay into the TSP. At 2 years of service, the government would begin matching the 
Marine’s contributions to the TSP up to 5% of pay.   
 
Change 3:  At 12 years of service, the military will provide a continuation bonus 
contingent on serving 4 more years of service. The bonus amounts to 2.5 times a service 
member’s monthly basic pay, taxed as ordinary income.   
 
Change 4:  Under the new retirement plan, Marines have the option of receiving a 
portion of their pension as a lump sum. In particular, a Marine can choose to receive at 
retirement a lump sum payment of either 25% or 50% of the pension payments they 
would have received through 67 years of age. If a lump sum option is chosen, monthly 
pension amounts will be reduced by 25% or 50% until age 67.    
 
Please click here for more information about the new retirement plan. 
 
Questions about new retirement 
 
12. Would you like more information regarding the new retirement plan? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
13. After reading this information, how well do you understand the current and new 
retirement plans? 
 
4 - Understand completely 
3 - Understand well, but have a few questions 
2 - Slightly confused, have many questions 
1 - Very confused, do not understand at all 
 
14. If you were subject to the new retirement plan, how many years of service would you 
expect to complete before separating from the Marine Corps? 
 **Answer range from 1 – 20+ years 
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15. Under the new retirement plan, you may have the option to opt into the new plan or 
remain under the current retirement plan. Which option would you choose? 
 a. Opt into the new plan 
 b. Remain under the current plan 
 
16. If you were under the new plan (whether you chose to be under it or not) what percent 
of your salary would you contribute to TSP? 
 a.  0% 
 b.  1% 
 c.  3% 
 d.  5% 
 e.  7% 
 f. More than 7% 
 
17. If offered the above lump sum payment and monthly pension, what would you do? 
 a. I would not take the lump sum option  
b. I would choose to take 25% as a lump sum  
c. I would choose to take 50% as a lump sum 
 
18. Do you feel that the information provided in this survey was sufficient for you to 
make informed choices regarding your retirement? 
 a. Yes 




MORE INFORMATION REGARDING THE NEW RETIREMENT PLAN 
 
Change 1: Upon retirement with at least 20 years of service, monthly pension payments 
would equal the amounts listed under the REDUX plan (refer to table above). As 
currently, the payments would be taxed as ordinary income. 
 
Change 2: A retirement savings plan will be introduced, which includes both 
contributions from the individual Marine as well as contributions from the government. 
The retirement savings plan will be using the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Upon entering 
the Marine Corps, the government would automatically establish a transfer of 3% of a 
Marine’s pay into the TSP – this is the Individual Contribution. A Marine can adjust their 
individual contribution after their first financial education course. The government would 
also deposit an amount equal to 1% of a Marine’s pay into the TSP – this is the 
Government Contribution.   
 
At 2 years of service, the government would begin matching the Marine’s 
contributions to the TSP up to 5% of pay. For example, if a Marine deposited 3% of their 
monthly pay to the TSP, the government would deposit an additional matching 3% into 
the Marine’s TSP. If, at any time, a Marine chooses to opt out of the TSP contribution, 
the government will continue to provide 1% of the Marine’s basic pay into the Marine’s 
TSP account. 
 
Individual Marines can choose how to invest their contributions in the TSP 
account. If you choose a safe investment, you have less of a chance of losing your 
investment, but you also will likely have a low rate of return; if you choose a less-safe 
investment, you are exposing your investment to more risk of losses, but you also have 
the chance to make a higher rate of return.  
 
Therefore, under the new retirement plan there would be two choices to make: (1) 
What percent of your monthly pay to contribute to your TSP, and (2) What type of 
investment you will make with your contributions. The tables below provide estimated 
TSP balances you would have at retirement if you began the new plan on 1 January 2018 
for several different investment types and individual contribution rates.  
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RISK AND RETURN INVESTMENT TABLES 
 
Note: The following tables’ monthly pension figures were calculated from the 2015 
military pay chart. The percentage listed at the top of the table is the individual Marine’s 
contribution. The monetary value captures the individual contribution as well as the 
government’s contribution. For example, if you contribute 1% to your TSP, the 
government will provide an additional 1% until you either retire or leave the Marine 
Corps. If you contribute 5% to your TSP, the government will provide 1% of your 
monthly pay from the start of your active duty until 2 years’ time in service. From 2 years 
onward, the government provides the 5% of your monthly pay until you retire or leave 
the Marine Corps. All those variations are captured in the final table. 
 
 




On average, this investment has a 5% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 chance 
that the return in any year will be anywhere between 1% and 9%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $4,500 $11,500 $18,500 $23,000 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $10,100 $28,100 $46,100 $56,100 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $16,100 $46,100 $76,200 $92,300 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $22,500 $65,500 $108,500 $131,000 
Then you will have, on average, 




On average, this investment has a 5% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 chance 
that the return in any year will be anywhere between 1% and 9%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $8,200 $21,000 $33,900 $43,000 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $19,200 $54,200 $89,100 $110,900 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $30,000 $86,400 $142,900 $176,800 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $41,300 $120,400 $199,500 $246,400 
Then you will have, on average, 








On average, this investment has a 7% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 chance 
that the return in any year will be anywhere between -11% and 25%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $6,300 $15,900 $25,500 $31,800 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $13,400 $37,300 $61,100 $74,600 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $20,600 $58,900 $97,200 $117,900 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $27,800 $80,400 $133,000 $160,800 
Then you will have, on average, 




On average, this investment has a 7% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 
chance that the return in any year will be anywhere between -11% and 25%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $11,300 $29,100 $46,800 $60,000 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $25,600 $71,900 $118,100 $148,400 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $38,500 $110,400 $182,400 $228,100 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $51,000 $148,100 $245,200 $305,900 
Then you will have, on average, 








On average, this investment has a 10% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 
chance that the return in any year will be anywhere between -15% and 35%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $10,200 $25,600 $41,100 $51,300 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $20,600 $56,700 $92,900 $113,500 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $30,000 $84,900 $139,800 $169,800 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $38,300 $109,900 $181,600 $219,900 
Then you will have, on average, 




On average, this investment has a 10% return per year, but there is a 2 out of 3 
chance that the return in any year will be anywhere between -15% and 35%. 
If you contribute this percent of 
your monthly pay to the TSP: 1% 3% 5% 7% 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 4 YOS: $18,300 $46,700 $75,100 $97,900 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 8 YOS: $39,100 $109,000 $178,900 $228,300 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 12 YOS: $55,900 $159,300 $262,700 $333,500 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 16 YOS: $70,500 $203,100 $335,800 $425,400 
Then you will have, on average, 
this amount of money at 20 YOS: $82,700 $239,800 $397,000 $502,300 
Note:  Not included in the calculations, TSP distributions are subject to state and federal 
income taxes at the time of payment. The monetary amounts listed in the above tables 
represent the balance of a TSP account at 20 years of service regardless of length of 
service. Marines are eligible to receive TSP payments at 59 and one-half years of age; 
however, a Marine may elect to receive TSP payments earlier but are subject to a 10% 
penalty tax in addition to other income taxes. 
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Change 3: At 12 years of service, the military will provide a continuation bonus 
contingent on serving 4 more years of service. The bonus amounts to 2.5 times a service 
member’s monthly basic pay, taxed as ordinary income. The below table provides 
estimated values for a continuation bonus. 
 
 







Note: The monthly pension figures were calculated from the 2015 military pay chart and 
average promotion rates according to HQMC. The amounts above are subject to federal 
and state income taxes. 
Change 4: Under the new retirement plan, Marines have the option of receiving a portion 
of their pension as a lump sum. In particular, a Marine can choose to receive at retirement 
a lump sum payment of either 25% or 50% of the pension payments they would have 
received through 67 years of age. If a lump sum option is chosen, monthly pension 
amounts will be reduced by 25% or 50% until age 67.   At 67 years of age, all Marines 
will receive 100% of their entitled monthly pay regardless of whether they opted to 
receive the lump sum payment. The table below provides the lump sum payment amounts 
and monthly payments under the lump sum option. 
 
 








E-6 $72,300 $1,100 $144,500 $800 
E-7 $86,700 $1,400 $173,400 $900 
E-8 $91,500 $1,400 $183,100 $1,000 
E-9 $106,000 $1,700 $212,000 $1,100 
O-4 $128,500 $2,300 $257,100 $1,500 
O-5 $141,400 $2,500 $282,800 $1,700 
Note: The tables’ figures were calculated from the 2015 military pay chart for a Marine 
who retired at 20 years of service. Age of retirement for enlisted personnel used in the 
above table is 38 years of age. Age of retirement for officers used in the above table is 44 
years of age. A 7% discount rate was used for the lump sum calculation based on OMB 
Circular A-94. The amounts above are subject to federal and state income taxes. 
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SECTION IV. MISCELLANEOUS 
 
19. Do you currently contribute to your TSP account?   
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 
20. If so, what percentage of your pay do you contribute? 
 **Text box fill-in 
 
21. If you are married, does your spouse currently work? 
 a. Yes 
 b. No 
 c. Not applicable 
 
22. What is your total household income, including your income (whether from the 
Marine Corps or another source) and any other dependents’ incomes? 
a. Less than $10,000 
 b.  $10,000 - $19,999 
c.  $20,000 - $29,999  
d.  $30,000 - $49,999  
e.  $50,000 - $59,999 
f.  $60,000 - $69,999 
g.  $70,000 - $79,999 
h.  $80,000 - $89,999 
i.  $90,000 - $99,999 
j.  $100,000 - $109,999 
k.  $110,000 - $119,999 
l.  $120,000 - $129,999 
m.  $130,000 - $139,999  
n.  $140,000 - $149,999 
o.  $150,000 - $159,999 
p.  $160,000 - $169,999 
q.  $170,000 - $179,999 
r.  $180,000 - $189,999 
s.  $190,000 - $199,999 
t.  $200,000 - $209,999 
u.  $210,000 - $219,999 
v.  $220,000 - $229,999 
w.  $230,000 - $239,999 
x.  $240,000 - $249,999 
y. More than $250,000 
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23. If you left the military today, what job sector would you most likely work in?  
Examples of particular professions are provided in parenthesis. 
a. Management, Business, Science, and Arts (Corporate and Business 
manager/CEO) 
b. Financial Specialists (Accountant, Tax Preparer, Financial Analyst) 
c. Computer and Mathematical (Software Programmer/Developer, Actuary, 
Statistician) 
d. Architecture and Engineering (Architects/Surveyor, Aerospace/Chemical/Civil 
Engineer) 
e. Life, Physical, and Social Science (Biologist, Chemist, Psychologist, 
Economist) 
f. Community and Social Services (Social Worker, Lawyer, Paralegal, Clergy) 
g. Education, Training, and Library (Teacher/Professor, Librarian) 
h. Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media (TV/Radio producer, 
Photographer, Public Relations) 
i. Healthcare Practitioners and Support (Doctor, Nurse, Dentist, Veterinarian, 
Physician Assistant) 
j. Protective Service (Law Enforcement, Corrections Officer, Fire Fighter, 
Animal Control, Private Investigator) 
k. Personal Care and Service (Chef, Bartender, Barber, Cosmetologist, Fitness 
Coach) 
l. Office and Administrative Support (Clerical/Administrator, Human Resources 
Assistant, Post Office Worker) 
m. Farming, Fishing, and Forestry (Farmer, Agricultural Inspector, Forest and 
Conservation Worker) 
n. Construction (Carpenter, Construction Laborer, Electrician) 
o. Transportation and Material Moving (Pilot, Logistician, Mass Transit 
Work/Operator) 
p. Don’t know  
 
24. How much would your annual salary be in the civilian sector if you left the military 
today? 
a. Less than $10,000 
 b.  $10,000 - $19,999 
c.  $20,000 - $29,999  
d.  $30,000 - $49,999  
e.  $50,000 - $59,999 
f.  $60,000 - $69,999 
g.  $70,000 - $79,999 
h.  $80,000 - $89,999 
i.  $90,000 - $99,999 
j.  $100,000 - $109,999 
k.  $110,000 - $119,999 
l.  $120,000 - $129,999 
m.  $130,000 - $139,999  
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n.  $140,000 - $149,999 
o.  $150,000 - $159,999 
p.  $160,000 - $169,999 
q.  $170,000 - $179,999 
r.  $180,000 - $189,999 
s.  $190,000 - $199,999 
t.  $200,000 - $209,999 
u.  $210,000 - $219,999 
v.  $220,000 - $229,999 
w.  $230,000 - $239,999 
x.  $240,000 - $249,999 
y. More than $250,000 
 
25. If you were not in the Marine Corps, how much would your dependents earn 
annually? 
a. Not Applicable 
b. Less than $10,000 
c.  $10,000 - $19,999 
d.  $20,000 - $29,999  
e.  $30,000 - $49,999  
f.  $50,000 - $59,999 
g.  $60,000 - $69,999 
h.  $70,000 - $79,999 
i.  $80,000 - $89,999 
j.  $90,000 - $99,999 
k.  $100,000 - $109,999 
l.  $110,000 - $119,999 
m.  $120,000 - $129,999 
n.  $130,000 - $139,999  
o.  $140,000 - $149,999 
p.  $150,000 - $159,999 
q.  $160,000 - $169,999 
r.  $170,000 - $179,999 
s.  $180,000 - $189,999 
t.  $190,000 - $199,999 
u.  $200,000 - $209,999 
v.  $210,000 - $219,999 
w.  $220,000 - $229,999 
x.  $230,000 - $239,999 
y.  $240,000 - $249,999 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Annual returns. n.d. Retrieved October 28, 2015, from 
https://www.tsp.gov/InvestmentFunds/FundPerformance/annualReturns.html 
Asch, B. J., Hosek, J., & Mattock, M. G. (2014). Toward meaningful military 
compensation reform: Research in support of DOD’s review. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR501.html  
Banks, J., Blundell, R., & Tanner, S. (1998). Is there a retirement-savings puzzle? 
American Economic Review, 88(4), 769–788. 
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. C. (2006). The importance of default 
options for retirement savings outcomes: Evidence from the United States (NBER 
Working Papers: 12009). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Bodie, Z., Marcus, A. J., & Merton, R. C. (1988). Defined benefit versus defined 
contribution pension plans: What are the real trade-offs? In Z. Bodie, J. B. Shoven 
& D. A. Wise (Eds.), Pensions in the U.S. economy (1st ed., pp. 139–162). 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Borjas, G. J. (2005). Labor economics (6th ed.). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2014). May 2014 National occupational employment and 
wage estimates: United States [data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#00-0000 
Carter, A. (2015a, March). House Appropriations Committee-Defense (budget request). 
Presented at U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC. 
Carter, A. (2015b, June 8). Department of Defense of the military compensation and 
retirement modernization commission recommendation on a blended retirement 
system [Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Choi, J. J. (2015). Contributions to defined contribution pension plans. (NBER Working 
Papers: 21467). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., & Metrick, A. (2001). For better or for worse: 
Default effects and 401(k) savings behavior. (NBER Working Papers: 8651). 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Clark, R. L., & Schieber, S. J. (2004). The transition to hybrid pension plans in the 
United States: An empirical analysis. In Gale W. G., Shoven J. B. and 
Warshawsky M. J.(Eds.), Private pensions and public policies (pp.11–-42) 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
 56 
Costo, S. L. (2006). Trends in retirement plan coverage over the last decade. Monthly 
Labor Review, 58–64. Retrieved from 
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/02/art5full.pdf 
Cunha, J. M., Menichini, A. A., & Crockett, A. (2015). The retention effects of high 
years of service cliff-vesting pension plans. Economics Letters, 126, 6–9. 
Department of Defense. (n.d.). Officer rank insignias. Retrieved from 
http://www.defense.gov/About-DOD/Insignias/Officers  
DOD Office of the Actuary. (2015). Valuation of the military retirement system. 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://actuary.defense.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cNAsB6O1pg8%3d&tabid=
11106&portalid=15 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, Pub.L. No. 74–271 § 416, 49 Stat. 
620 (2015). Retrieved from http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Social% 
20Security%20Act-TITLE%20II(Federal%20Old-Age,%20Survivors,% 
20and%20Disability%20Insurance%20Benefits).pdf  
Friedman, M. (1957). The permanent income hypothesis. In M. Friedman (Ed.), A theory 
of the consumption function (pp. 20–37). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4405 
Grable, J., & Lytton, R. H. (1999). Financial risk tolerance revisited: The development of 
a risk assessment instrument. Financial Services Review, 8(3), 163–181. 
Gustman, A. L., & Steinmeier, T. L. (1986). A structural retirement model. 
Econometrica, 54(3), 555–584. 
Gustman, A. L., Steinmeier, T. L., & Tabatabai, N. (2015). Declining wealth and work 
among male veterans in the health and retirement study (NBER Working Papers: 
21736). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hastings, J. S., Madrian, B. C., & Skimmyhorn, W. L. (2012). Financial literacy, 
financial education and economic outcomes. (NBER working paper no. 18412). 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. (1997, June 15). Marine Corps total force 
systems manual (MCO P1080.20M w/ Ch. 1–2). Washington, DC: Author. 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. (2006, May 11). Marine Corps promotion 
manual, volume 2, enlisted promotions (MCO P1400.32D). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. (2015, Sep. 8). Military occupational 
specialties manual (NAVMC 1200.1A w/ Ch. 1). Washington, DC: Author. 
 57 
Heckman, J. (1974). Life cycle consumption and labor supply: An explanation of the 
relationship between income and consumption over the life cycle. The American 
Economic Review, 64(1), 188–194. 
Johnson, B. R. (2013). The golden goose in the crosshairs: The transition to defined 
contribution pension plans in the public sector: Unintended consequences. 
Journal of Health and Human Services Administration, 35(4), 414–468. 
Kamarck, K. N. (2015). Military retirement: Background and recent developments (CRS 
Report No. RL33539). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34751.pdf 
Kastrinsky, I. G. (1999). Making a sound transition to a cash balance pension plan. 
Employee Benefits Journal, 24(2), 15–20. 
Laitner, J., & Sonnega, A. (2013). Economic theories of retirement. In M. Wang (Ed.), 
The oxford handbook of retirement (pp. 136–151). New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lazear, E. P. (1990). Pensions and deferred benefits as strategic compensation. Industrial 
Relations, 29(2), 263. 
MacDonald, B., & Caims, A. J. (2011). Three retirement decision models for defined 
contribution pension plan members: A simulation study. Insurance, Mathematics 
& Economics, 48(1), 1. 
Manchester, C. F. (2010). The effect of pension plan type on retirement age: 
Distinguishing plan incentives from career length preferences. Southern 
Economic Journal, 77(1), 104–125. 
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. (2015). Military 
compensation and retirement modernization commission: Final report. Arlington, 
VA. Retrieved from www.mcrmc.gov/public/docs/report/MCRMC-FinalReport-
29JAN15-HI.pdf 
Mitchell, O. S. (1999). New evidence on the money’s worth of individual annuities. 
American Economic Review, 89(5), 1299–1318. doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1299 
National Crosswalk Service Center. (2016). Military crosswalk [date file and code book]. 
Retrieved from http://www.workforceinfodb.org/ftp/download/military/ 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
Office of Management and Budget. (1992, Oct. 29). Guidelines and discount rates for 
benefit-cost analysis of federal programs (OMB Circular A-94). Washington, DC: 
Author.  
 58 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2015a). United States 
Department of Defense fiscal year 2016 budget request: Overview. Retrieved 
from http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/ 
fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2015b). Military personnel 
programs (M-1): Department of Defense fiscal year 2016. Retrieved from 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/fy2016_
m1.pdf 
Requirements. n.d. Retrieved March 7, 2016, from 
https://www.marines.com/eligibility/requirements 
Simon, C. J., Warner, J. T., & Pleeter, S. (2015). Discounting, cognition, and financial 
awareness: New evidence from a change in the military retirement system. 
Economic Inquiry, 53(1), 318–334. 
Smith, J. S., & West, J. E. (2012). Retirement pay and officer retention. (NBER Working 
Papers: 18502). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save more tomorrow: Using behavioral economics 
to increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112(1), S164-S187. 
Towell, P. (2015). Defense: FY2015 authorization and appropriations (CRS Report No. 
R43788). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43788.pdf 
Trager, J. R. (2014). Military retirement: Alternate final pay and cost of living indexing 
(master’s thesis). Retrieved from Calhoun 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/42744 
TSP funds. n.d. Retrieved October 28, 2015, from http://www.tspfolio.com/tspfunds 
Warner, J. T., & Pleeter, S. (2001). The personal discount rate: Evidence from military 
downsizing programs. The American Economic Review, 91(1), 33–53. 
What you need to know now about cash-balance pension plans. (2000). HR Focus, 77(7), 
3–5. 
Zickar, M. J. (2013). The evolving history of retirement within the United States. In M. 
Wang (Ed.), The oxford handbook of retirement (pp. 10–21). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press.  
 59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
